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Examining the Trump Administration’s Transgender Service Ban 
through an International Human Rights Law Framework 
MATTHEW J. LANG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Six months after his inauguration as President of the United States, in a July 
2017 tweet, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced his administration’s plan 
to ban openly transgender individuals from serving in the United States’ Armed 
Forces (hereinafter the “transgender service ban”).1 This decision reverses a 2016 
Obama administration decision permitting openly transgender persons to serve in 
the U.S. military.2 Later, Trump formalized his order, issuing a Presidential 
Memorandum on August 25, 2017.3 “First, the Memorandum indefinitely extends 
a prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military, a process 
formally referred to as “accession” . . . . Second, the Memorandum requires the 
military to authorize, by no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of 
transgender service members.”4 The memorandum singles out the costs of 
providing healthcare to transgender service members as a primary catalyst of the 
order, with a specific focus on care related to sexual transition.5 This memorandum 
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 1.  Complaint at 2, Karnoski v. Trump (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-1297), http://law 
professors.typepad.com/files/karnoski_us_20170828_complaint.pdf See also Derek Hawkins, Trump’s 
Tweets Come Back to Bite Him in Court Again, This Time in Transgender Military Case, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/31/trumps-
tweets-come-back-to-bite-him-in-court-again-this-time-in-transgender-military-
case/?utm_term=.418a68aadbf3; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 26, 2017, 5:55 am), 
https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864?lang=en (“After consultation with 
my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept 
or allow . . .); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 26, 2017, 6:04 am), 
https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472?lang=en (Transgender individuals to 
serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”). 
 2.  Complaint at 2, Karnoski v. Trump (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-1297). 
 3.  Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Military Service by Transgender Individuals (Aug. 25, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/presidential-memorandum-secretary-
defense-and-secretary-homeland. (Note that document was not included in the Federal Register). 
 4.  Doe 1 v. Trump, Civil Action No, 17—1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017). 
 5.  See Presidential Memorandum supra note 3, §§ 1 & 2(b) (“[T]he previous Administration failed 
to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and 
practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military 
resources . . . Accordingly, . . . The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, shall . . . halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex reassignment 
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has been challenged in United States Courts, with mixed success.6 In December 
2017, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice appealed at least one of 
the District Court rulings enjoining the transgender service ban and requested an 
emergency stay on implementation of the court’s ruling, which was denied, 
allowing transgender persons to begin enlisting in the armed forces in January 
2018.7 
As litigation concerning the transgender service ban proceeds in U.S. Federal 
Courts,8 it is worth exploring alternate forums within which the ban may be 
challenged. This is so because of the state of domestic constitutional law in relation 
to transgender status,9 and the strength of presidential powers over national 
security and the military.10 The international human rights law framework 
provides advocates with an alternate body of law, and alternate forums, 
including—most importantly—treaty monitoring bodies [TMBs], through which 
 
surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an 
individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.”). 
 6.  See e.g. id. (granting in part, and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin the 
Trump administration’s policy, and granting in part, and denying in part the United States 
Government’s motion to dismiss); Stone v. Trump, Civil Action No. MJG—17—2459, 2017 WL 5589122 
(D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017); see also Karnoski v. Trump, Case No. C17-01297MJP, 2017 WL 5668071 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 27, 2017) (granting motion by the State of Washington to intervene). But see Williamson v. 
Trump, 7:17-cv-01490-LSC, 2017 W.L. 4536419 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2017) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claim 
without prejudice). 
 7.  Chris Johnson, DOJ Appeals Ruling Against Trump’s Transgender Military Ban, WASHINGTON 
BLADE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/11/21/doj-appeals-ruling-against-
trump/. 
 8.  On December 22, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the 
Trump administration’s emergency request for a stay pending appeal, see Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17—
5267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017), citing the administration’s failure to “satisf[y] the 
stringent requirements for a stay pending appeal, as the rationale behind the denial. The Department 
of Defense thereafter refused to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, clearing the way for transgender 
recruits to enlist in the military in January 2018. See Lawrence Hurley, Idrees Ali, & REUTERS, US 
Military to Accept Transgender Recruits after Justice Department Decides not to Appeal Court Ruling, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/transgender-recruits-allowed-to-
serve-in-military-2017-12. Media sources report however, that the Trump administration has not 
entirely given up appealing the original ruling by the District Court holding the ban unconstitutional. 
Id. (quoting “an anonymous Justice Department Official”) (“The Department of Defense has announced 
that it will be releasing an independent study of these issues in the coming weeks. So rather than litigate 
this interim appeal before that occurs, the administration has decided to wait for DOD’s study and will 
continue to defend the president’s lawful authority in district court in the meantime.”). Therefore, 
while the administration’s refusal to appeal the denial of the emergency stay pending appeal is a 
positive sign that domestic litigation surrounding the transgender military ban is succeeding, it 
remains to be seen whether the administration will later continue the appeal of the district court’s 
original decision. In any event, examining alternate fora for advocacy challenging the transgender 
service ban remains a worthwhile endeavor, if only to raise awareness about the overall status of 
discrimination against transgender persons in the United States. The transgender service ban serves as 
a prime example of the type of discrimination faced by transgender people, and using the 
administration’s action as demonstrative of such discrimination may force action on other fronts of 
discrimination as well. 
 9.  See infra notes 11-27.  
 10.  See infra notes 28-34. 
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challenges to the transgender service ban, and other forms of discrimination 
against the transgender community—of which the transgender service ban is 
highly exemplary—can be levied. 
This paper will examine the applicability of international human rights law 
to the transgender service ban, with the objective of determining the most effective 
means of challenging the transgender service ban through the human rights 
framework. First, I briefly examine United States constitutional law as it has been 
applied to the transgender community, and law concerning presidential power 
over military and national security matters. This discussion demonstrates how 
domestic law, alone, may not be enough to derail the Trump administration’s plan 
to ban transgender service. Second, I examine international human rights law, 
with specific focus on the conventions, treaties, and customary law most apt to 
provide for a successful challenge to the military service ban. Third, I examine how 
international human rights law may be used to challenge the transgender service 
ban, or other forms of state sanctioned discrimination against the transgender 
community. Fourth, I conclude with an examination of why advocates should,  
despite the challenges presented, pursue a challenge to the transgender service 
ban under international human rights law. 
I. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 
A. Constitutional Challenges to Transgender Discrimination. 
The U.S. Constitution provides legal advocates with tools that can be used to 
challenge unequal treatment under the law,11 as well as any denial of liberty or 
property without due process of law.12 The Fifth Amendment was first used to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected classification in Bolling v. Sharpe, 
which dealt with racial discrimination in education in the District of Columbia.13 
Expanding on the Brown v. Board doctrine, the Court, in Bolling held that the federal 
government was required to ensure equal protection under the law, just as states 
were required to so do under the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Later, in Reed v. Reed, 
the Court struck down a state statute that discriminated on the basis of sex, 
holding for the first time that sex-based discrimination violated the equal 
protection guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment.15  
While the Court has never had an opportunity to decide a case challenging a 
federal statute for discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of Fifth 
Amendment equal protection guarantees, the Court’s decision in the 2015 case 
United States v. Windsor, supports the general proposition that discrimination by 
the federal government on the basis of sex violates Fifth Amendment equal 
 
 11.  U.S. CONST. Amend. V; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  
 12.  U.S. CONST. Amend. V.  
 13.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in schooling within 
the District of Columbia violated Equal Protection guarantees inherent in the Vth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause, which, as opposed to the XIV Amendment that only restricts actions taken by state 
governments, applies to the Federal government). 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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protection and due process guarantees.16 In Windsor, the Court struck down 
operative sections of the Defense of Marriage Act, which limited the validity of 
marriage to heterosexual couples regardless of a state’s definition of marriage.17 
The Court’s decision extends Fifth Amendment protections to same-sex couples 
and demonstrates that Fifth Amendment equal protection extends beyond 
protecting members of racial minorities. 
However, recent Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state laws restricting 
access to public facilities on the basis of transgender identity have not been 
successful. In 2016, the Court effectively dismissed a high profile18 challenge to a 
Virginia state school bathroom ordinance, which required that students use school 
sex-segregated facilities that corresponded to their biological sex assigned at 
birth.19 Following a change in executive guidance involving federal anti-
discrimination statute Title IX, the Court remanded the challenge to the Fourth 
Circuit where a preliminary injunction issued by the district court was ultimately 
vacated.20 In August 2017, that case, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, was 
again before the Fourth Circuit, where the district court’s first decision in the 
case,21 which reserved decision on the equal protection challenge levied by the 
plaintiff against the defendant school board, was remanded once more for a 
determination about whether the entire challenge was rendered moot by the 
plaintiff’s graduation from the defendant school system.22 
Several district courts have held that heightened scrutiny applies to practices 
challenged for discriminating against transgender status.23 But, consensus among 
authoritative precedent remains elusive. Several U.S. courts of appeals have held 
that transgender persons are protected from gender identity discrimination under 
a sex-equality equal protection theory.24 Evaluating claims under a sex-equality 
framework would lead to challenged government action being evaluated by courts 
 
 16.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2015). 
 17.  Id. at 2695-96 (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains 
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. . . . By seeking 
to displace [state protections] and treating [homosexual] persons as living in marriages less respected 
than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment”). 
 18.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bathroom Case Puts Transgender Student on National Stage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-rights-bathroom. 
html. 
 19.  G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056, 2016 4th Cir., certiorari granted, 137 
S.Ct. 369 (2016), summary disposition granted, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (March 6, 2017) (summarily disposing 
grant of certiorari by vacating and remanding case for reconsideration “in light of the guidance 
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017”). 
 20.  G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 2017) (granting “unopposed 
motion to vacate preliminary injunction” of district court). 
 21.  G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F.Supp.3d 736 (E.D. Va. Sep. 17, 2015). 
 22.  Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017).   
 23.  See e.g. Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F.Supp.3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Norsworthy v. 
Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D. Calif. 2015); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United 
States Dep’t of Educ., 208 F.Supp.3d 850 (S.D. Oh., 2016).  
 24.  See e.g. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscrimination against 
a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s 
described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”). 
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under heightened scrutiny.25 However, given the substantial deference afforded to 
the executive by courts evaluating decisions involving national security and the 
military,26 it is unclear whether an equal protection challenge to the transgender 
service ban would succeed. This is because hearing courts evaluate not only the 
discriminatory acts challenged, but also the “important governmental objectives” 
at play, under heightened scrutiny.27 
B. Executive Power Over Matters Involving National Security and the Military 
Military policies have historically been afforded a special degree of deference 
by reviewing courts—noticeably more than that afforded to other policies 
challenged for violating equal protection guarantees.28 In matters involving 
national security and the military, “the Constitution itself requires special 
deference” be afforded to decisions made by the legislature and the executive.29 
“Aside from the Constitution itself, the need for deference also arises from the 
unique role that national defense plays in a democracy.”30 Ultimately, courts will 
defer to the political branches on matters involving national security and the 
military because “the imprimatur of the President, the Congress, or both imparts 
a degree of legitimacy to military decisions that courts cannot hope to 
confer.”31Although this deference does not immunize decisions concerning 
national security and the military from judicial review,32 “[t]he operation of a 
healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military 
affairs is evident” in judicial hesitancy to consider challenges to decisions of the 
political branches in this space.33 
 
 25.  See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citations omitted) (“[T]he 
party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the 
burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification. . . .  The burden is 
met only by showing at least that the classification serves “important governmental objectives and that 
the discriminatory means employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”). 
 26.  See infra notes 28-34. 
 27.  Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). 
 28.  See e.g. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (while upholding the validity of a 
military policy banning service by homosexuals, holding: “[t]he special deference we owe the 
military’s judgment necessarily affects the scope of the court’s inquiry into the rationality of the 
military’s policy”). 
 29.  Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding an equal protection challenge 
to the military policy banning service by homosexuals). See also id. at 925-26 (“National defense 
decisions not only implicate each citizen in the most profound way. Such decisions also require policy 
choices, which the legislature is equipped to make and the judiciary is not. . . . While Congress and the 
President have access to intelligence and testimony on military readiness, the federal judiciary does 
not. While Congress and the members of the Executive Branch have developed a practiced expertise 
by virtue of their day-to-day supervision of the military, the federal judiciary has not. The judiciary has 
no Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Department of Defense, or Department 
of State.”). 
 30.  Id. at 925.  
 31.  Id. at 926. 
 32.  Id. at 927. 
 33.  Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (upholding Congressional action excluding women 
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Several of the judicial decisions referenced above may be considered 
outdated, primarily because they address challenges to the long standing but since 
repealed, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” excluded openly 
gay persons from serving in the armed forces.34 While some time has passed since 
these cases were decided, and the policy at issue has since been repealed, the cases 
nonetheless reveal the level of judicial deference that would likely be afforded to 
executive judgments about military service among members of transgender 
community by reviewing courts. Absent Congressional action nullifying the 
President’s transgender service ban,35 judicial review of the ban by appellate courts 
under an equal protection framework has an acute risk of failure. That risk should 
caution against an advocacy strategy exclusively focused on litigating the ban in 
U.S. courts. 
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S APPLICABILITY TO THE                    
TRANSGENDER SERVICE BAN 
A. Applicability of Core Human Rights Treaties in the United States 
The United States has ratified several core human rights conventions that 
protect individual rights threatened by the transgender service ban. Among them 
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR],36 and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment [CAT].37 
Additionally, the United States government’s signatures of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],38 and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
[CEDAW],39 impose obligations on the United States to “refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose of [those] treat[ies].”40 While this signatory 
obligation—to refrain from conduct violative of the object and purpose of a 
 
from draft registration). 
 34.  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was ended by Congressional action and executive support in 2010. 
See 10 U.S.C. § 654, (repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111-321 § 2(f)(1)(A), 
Stat. 3516 (Dec. 22, 2010)); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html. 
 35.  The legislative response to the transgender service ban was swift, but failed just as swiftly. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Transgender Military Service, (accessed Dec. 10, 2017) (describing a 
bipartisan amendment introduced in the Senate to protect against transgender troops being 
discharged, and how Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell “ended debate before the amendment 
was able to receive a vote.” Also discussing bipartisan bills introduced in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives that would achieve the same end.) 
 36.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
 37.  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 24 I.L.M. 535. 
 38.  International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 39.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 96-53, 19 I.L.M. 33. 
 40.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 92-1, U.C. 
Conf. on the L. of Treaties—First and Second Sessions—Official Doc., UN SALES NO. E.70.V.5. 
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treaty—is established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,41 a 
convention that remains unratified by the United States,42 scholars have noted that 
customary international law norms nonetheless suggest the United States is bound 
by the Convention’s obligations.43 “To the extent that Article 18 does reflect 
customary international law, the signing obligation would apply even to States 
that have not ratified the Vienna Convention.”44 For the purposes of the remainder 
of this work, I will assume that as a matter of customary international law, Article 
18 obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties impose on the 
United States obligations to not infringe upon the object and purpose of treaties to 
which it is a signatory party. 
B. Substantive Obligations under International Human Rights Instruments 
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICCPR textually imposes negative obligations45 upon States that have 
ratified the convention to not discriminate on the basis of “sex . . . or other status,”46 
to ensure freedom from “torture, or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,”47 
 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (accessed Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (noting that while the United States has not ratified 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[t]he United States considers many of the provisions 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law 
of treaties.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 307, 315 n. 36 (2007) (citing commentary by U.S. government officials acknowledging 
status of Article 18 as customary international law). 
 43.  See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, Treaty Signature, 8 in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES (Duncan Hollis, 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2012), available at  https://scholarship.law.duke.edu /faculty_scholarship 
/2463/ (citing Curtis A. Bradley supra note 40 at 315 n. 36 (citing “statements by U.S. officials suggesting 
at various times that Article 18 reflects customary international law.”); BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 
ANNE-MARIE LA ROSA, AND MAKANE MOISE MBENGUE, ‘Article 18’ in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (vol. 1, Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein, eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Paolo Palchetti, ARTICLE 18 OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION: A VAGUE AND INEFFECTIVE 
OBLIGATION OR A USEFUL MEANS OF STRENGTHENING LEGAL COOPERATION? (in THE LAW OF TREATIES 
BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION, Enzo Cannizarro, ed., Oxford University Press, 2011); Mark E. 
Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009)) (While 
noting that “[i]t is not clear to what extent [Article 18] reflects customary international law[, and that 
s]ome commentators contend that, at least at the time it was included in the [Vienna Convention on 
the Law or Treaties] VCTL, it reflected progressive development rather than established state practice,” 
arguing Article 18 and “the VCTL ha[ve] now been in force for many years and ha[ve] been ratified by 
over 110 States, and even some countries that are not parties to it (such as the United States) appear to 
accept that the obligation recited in Article 18 is now a matter of customary international law.”). 
 44.  See id. at 8.  
 45.  Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a Form of 
Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 423, 429 n. 17 (2014) (“The difference between positive and neg- 
ative obligations, rather is that one requires inaction (negative obligations) and the other demands 
action (positive obligations)”). 
 46.  ICCPR, supra note 36, art’s. 2 & 26. 
 47.  Id., art. 7. 
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to ensure “the right to freedom of expression,”48 “the right to liberty and security 
of person,”49 and the right [of every citizen], without any of the distinctions 
mentioned [in the non-discrimination provision] and without unreasonable 
restrictions . . . [t]o have access, on general terms equality, to public service in his 
country.”50 Additionally, States Parties must ensure access to “an effective 
remedy” for violations of rights under the convention.51 
As interpreted in general comments and communication decisions issued by 
the Human Rights Committee, the rights contained in the ICCPR protect against a 
wider array of adverse State action than what the text of the provisions alone 
imply. The rights to be free from discrimination contained in Articles 2 and 26 of 
the ICCPR include the right of freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation,52 and the free-standing discrimination prohibition in Article 26 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity.53 While sexual orientation 
and gender identity remain distinct facets of personal identity,54 the Independent 
Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity has noted that international law is increasingly 
recognizing the right of individuals to be free from discrimination based on their 
gender identities.55 Therefore, Article 2 would likely be interpreted to include a 
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender 
status, as well. 
In General Comment 18, the Human Rights Council further notes that the 
prohibitions against discrimination contained in ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 differ in 
 
 48.  Id., art. 19. 
 49.  Id., art. 9(1). 
 50.  Id., art. 25(c).  
 51.  Id., art. 2(3)(a). 
 52.  Human Rights Committee Communication No. 488/1992, Toonen v. Australia, para. 8.7 (Mar. 
21, 1994), available in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL (Vol. 5, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/sdecisions vol5en.pdf. 
 53.  See Human Rights Committee Communication No. 2172/2012, G. v. Australia, para. 7.12 (June 
28, 2017) (“In this context, the Committee observes that the prohibition against discrimination under 
article 26 encompasses discrimination on the basis of marital status and gender identity, including 
transgender status.”). 
 54.  See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/36, at 3 (Apr. 19, 
2017), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/095/53/PDF/G1709553.pdf?Open 
Element (“Sexual orientation has an external dimension —  it indicates a person’ s sexual inclination 
and feelings towards others. Gender identity has an internal dimension —  the term refers to how a 
person self-identifies in regard to his or her own gender, which may be different from the gender 
assigned at birth.”). 
 55.  See id. at 8 (“As evidenced by the wide range of international human rights treaties that are in 
force, international human rights bodies and procedures —  ranging from the human rights treaty 
bodies, with their general comments and recommendations, to the universal periodic review, to the 
special procedures’ coverage of sexual orientation and gender identity-related violations, to resolutions 
and studies —  the international human rights system has been strengthening the promotion and 
protection of human rights without distinction. The protection of persons based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity, and the mandate of the Independent Expert, are based on international 
law, complemented and supplemented by State practice.”). 
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applicability and the scope of the prohibitions contained within each.56 While 
Article 2 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination with respect to the rights and 
privileges guaranteed in the remainder of the covenant, Article 26 is a free-
standing right, which “prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities.”57 Discrimination “should be 
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is 
based on any ground . . .  and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal 
footing, of all rights and freedoms.”58 
Additionally, the right to be free from torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, contained in ICCPR Article 7 is understood to prohibit “not 
only acts that cause physical pain but also . . . acts that cause mental suffering.”59 
“The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the [ICCPR] is to protect both the dignity 
and the physical and mental integrity of the individual.”60 The right to freedom of 
expression in Article 19 has been interpreted to include a right of “commentary on 
one’s own . . . affairs.”61 Importantly, the right to liberty and security of person in 
Article 9 is understood to “concern[] freedom from injury to the body and the 
mind, or bodily and mental integrity,”62 “proceeding from any governmental or 
private actors.”63 The Human Rights Committee notes that this Article 9 guarantee 
applies to “[e]veryone’ includ[ing], among others, . . . lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender persons.”64 Finally, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted that 
the right of equal access to public service positions in Article 25(c) obligates States 
to ensure “criteria for appointment . . . be objective and reasonable,” and further 
imposes on States an affirmative obligation “to ensure that there is equal access to 
public service for all citizens.”65 
 
 56.  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Non-discrimination, General Comment No. 18 (37th Sess. 
1989). 
 57.  Id. at 3.  
 58.  Id. at 2.  
 59.  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 7 Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, General Comment No. 20, at 1 (44th Sess. 1992). 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 19 Freedoms of opinion and expression, General 
Comment No. 34, at 3 (102nd Sess. 2011) (citing Communication No. 1189/2003, Fernando v. Sri Lanka 
(Mar. 31, 2005)). 
 62.  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 9 Liberty and security of person, General Comment No. 
35, at 1 (112th Sess. 2014). 
 63.  Id. at 3.  
 64.  Id. at 1.  
 65.  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 25 The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights 
and the right of equal access to public service, General Comment No. 25, at 1 (57th Sess. 1996). While 
discrimination on the basis of access to public service seems largely based on political opportunity and 
participation, in a recent speech to the Commission on the Status of Women, U.N. Secretary General 
António Guterres stressed the importance of “open[ing] doors of opportunity for women and girls: in 
classrooms and boardrooms, in military ranks, and at peace talks, in all aspects of productive life.” See 
UNITED NATIONS, UN Commission on Status of Women Opens with Calls for More Men to Stand Up for 
Equality, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 13, 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting opening remarks by Secretary-
General António Guterres), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56343#.Wn37l-jwaUk. 
Because the illegality of discrimination on the basis of sex in the military appears to have at least been 
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There are significant limitations on the applicability of these principles to the 
transgender service ban, however, because of the reservations, understandings, 
and declarations filed by the United States government when it ratified the 
ICCPR.66 Despite these concerns, the human rights framework remains  important 
in challenging the transgender service ban because of the alternate forums and 
methods of challenging the ban’s legitimacy that exist because of international 
human rights law.67 
Ultimately, the transgender service ban discriminates against a group of 
individuals on the basis of their status as transgender individuals, in violation of 
the non-discrimination provisions of the ICCPR.68 Even absent discrimination on 
the basis of a substantive civil or political rights protected by the ICCPR, the 
convention’s Article 26 free-standing prohibition on discrimination on any basis, 
including on the basis of transgender identity,69 involving “any field regulated . . . 
by public authorities,”70 would create an actionable harm under the ICCPR among 
transgender persons wanting to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. Additionally, given 
that substantive rights protected by the ICCPR are being violated by the 
transgender service ban, Article 2’s additional prohibition against discrimination 
is also applicable here.71 
Among the substantive protections being violated is ICCPR Article 7’s 
prohibition against “torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”72 
Considering the serious impacts of transgender discrimination,73 the United States 
government is infringing on its duties under Article 7 to “protect . . . the dignity . 
. . and the mental integrity of the individual,” by actively excluding them from 
military service74 Additionally, the transgender service ban infringes upon 
individuals’ rights to “security of person” found in article 9 of the ICCPR.75 As 
noted above, security of person “concerns freedom from injury to the . . . the mind 
. . . and mental integrity,”76 and applies to all persons, with the Human Rights 
 
contemplated by high-ranking U.N. officials, and because the U.S. government largely considers 
voluntary service in the armed forces in the public service, see generally supra notes 30-33, Article 25(c) 
of the ICCPR should not be dismissed as irrelevant to the present analysis. 
 66.  See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Unanimous-Consent Agreement) 
(Reserving the applicability of Article 7’s prohibition against torture as creating a binding obligation 
only insofar as treatment falling under the purview of Article 7’s prohibitions would also be in violation 
of Amendments VIII, V, or XIV to the United States Constitution and understanding Articles 2 and 26 
to not prohibit discrimination when such discrimination is “at a minimum, rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental objective.”).  
 67.  See infra notes 146-58. 
 68.  See supra notes 52-58. 
 69.  See Human Rights Committee, supra note 53. 
 70.  See Human Rights Committee, supra note 56.  
 71.  See supra notes 52-58. 
 72.  ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 7. 
 73.  Katherine Schreiber & Heather Hausenblas, Why Transgender People Experience More Mental 
Health Issues, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com /blog/the-truth-
about-exercise-addiction/201612/why-transgender-people-experience-more-mental-health. 
 74.  See Human Rights Committee, supra notes 60-62. 
 75.  ICCPR, supra note 36, Article 9. 
 76.  See Human Rights Committee, supra note 62. 
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Committee taking explicit note of its applicability to persons who identify as 
transgender.77 Transgender persons who are subject to discrimination experience 
significant psychological distress,78 which often has repercussions for their social 
lives, and abilities to meaningfully contribute to society.79 The State mandated 
discrimination required by President Trump’s transgender service ban further 
stigmatizes a segment of the population that already experiences significant harms 
because of discrimination. The additional harm that this ban imposes violates 
international obligations under the ICCPR. 
Furthermore, the rights to freedom of self-expression,80 and equal access to 
public service,81 are infringed upon by the discriminatory impact of the 
transgender service ban.82 The transgender service ban restricts a class of persons 
from freely expressing their own identities, so long as they want to retain equal 
access to the opportunity to serve their country in the armed forces. The military’s 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which banned openly gay individuals from serving 
in the military, had similar ramifications for freedom of expression.83 Persons may 
choose to hide their gender identity in order to enlist in the armed services, but 
would do so at the expense of their rights to freely express themselves, particularly 
their right to freedom of expression concerning their own affairs.84 Further, the 
transgender service ban explicitly prohibits a class of individuals from performing 
a type of public service which is necessary to the adequate functioning of 
American society.85 Prohibiting transgender individuals from enlisting in the 
military, regardless of the rationale behind the ban, directly contravenes these 
legal obligations imposed on the United States by the ICCPR. 
 
 
 
 77.  See Human Rights Committee, supra notes 62-64. 
 78.  Rebeca Robles, et al., Removing Transgender Identity from the Classification of Mental Disorders: A 
Mexican Field Study for ICD-11, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 850, 856 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
science/article/pii/S2215036616301651?via%3Dihub. 
 79.  See id. (“Distress and dysfunction can occur in disapproving social environments and that 
individuals with gender incongruence are at increased risk . . . social isolation, school dropout, loss of 
employment, homelessness, disrupted interpersonal relationships, physical injuries, social rejection, 
stigmatisation, victimisation, and violence.”). 
 80.  ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 19. 
 81.  ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 25(c). 
 82.  ICCPR, supra note 36, Art.  2. 
 83.  See Geoffrey W. Bateman & Claude J. Summers, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, glbtq, inc., at 1 (2015), 
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/dont_ask_S.pdf (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” appeared less 
discriminatory because it did not allow the military to ask recruits about their sexual orientation when 
they joined, thereby making it possible for closeted gays and lesbians to serve. Yet the moment service 
members “told,” or made statements that remotely suggested they might be gay or lesbian, under 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the military had grounds to investigate and discharge them for being 
homosexual or participating in homosexual sex.”) Similarly, the transgender service ban would—at 
least—conceivably allow individuals who don’t reveal their sex non-conforming gender identities prior 
to enlisting in the armed forces, to serve. 
 84.  Human Rights Committee, supra note 61. 
 85.  See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925 (“The need for deference also arises from the unique 
role that national defense plays in a democracy.”); see also id. (“National defense decisions . . . implicate 
each citizen in the most profound way.”). 
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2. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  
Treatment or Punishment 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment [CAT] prohibits “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official.”86 In addition, Article 2 of the covenant prohibits “a threat of war,” or any 
other “exceptional circumstances” from being used “as a justification of torture.”87 
Nor may “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority . . . be invoked 
as a justification for torture.”88 Importantly, Article 16 of CAT proscribes 
“treatment or punishment which do[es] not amount to torture as defined in Article  
1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”89 
Upon ratification, the United States government filed with the United 
Nations, an important series of limiting reservations to CAT’s provisions. 
Specifically, the United States reserved consent to be bound by the CAT Article 16 
prohibitions against acts that would constitute “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,” only insofar as such treatment would be prohibited by 
the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.90 
Several CAT State Parties objected to this reservation,91 with one even arguing 
that it is “incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.”92 As 
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation made 
by a State in adopting a treaty is invalid if, among other reasons, it “is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.”93 However, absent a notable concern 
that the reservation violates the object and purpose of the treaty, and arguably a 
pronouncement by the International Court of Justice [ICJ] that the reservation is 
incompatible,94 under the Vienna Convention, an objection to a reservation has the 
 
 86.  CAT, supra note 37, art. 1(1). 
 87.  Id. art. 2(1). 
 88.  Id. art. 2(3). 
 89.  Id., art. 16. 
 90.  See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Unanimous-Consent Agreement). 
 91.  Finland, With Regard to the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations Made by the United 
States of America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 27, 1996; The Netherlands, With Regard to the Reservations, 
Understandings and Declarations Made by the United States of America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 26, 1996; 
Sweden, With Regard to the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations Made by the United States of 
America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 27, 1996. See also Germany, notification to the Secretary-General (Feb. 
26, 1996) (“it is the understanding of the Federal Republic of Germany that [the said reservations and 
understandings] do not touch upon the obligations of the United States of America as a State Party to 
the Convention.”). These objections are available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en]. 
 92.  The Netherlands, supra note 91. 
 93.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 19(c).  
 94.  See THE YALE L. J. COMP. INC., The Effect of Obligations to Treaty Reservations, 60 YALE L.J. 728, 
734 n. 24 (1951) (arguing that the advisory ICJ opinion procedure should be utilized by the General 
Assembly when questions concerning the object and purpose of a treaty arise in the context of treaty 
reservations and objections to reservations.); see also Marko Milanovic & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, 
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effect of nullifying the agreement between the disagreeing State Parties to the 
extent covered by the reservation.95 Therefore, while the impact of these objections 
is likely limited, the effects of having called into question the United States’ 
reservations under CAT could have repercussive effects for non-litigation focused 
advocacy at the Committee Against Torture. 
Recently, CAT’s treaty monitoring body, the Committee Against Torture, 
began to recognize laws that impose “preconditions to legal gender recognition” 
as concerning, considering obligations arising under CAT.96 Commentators have 
noted that the Committee’s recommendations on the applicability of CAT 
protections to laws that discriminate against and harm the transgender 
community, “may have wider implications for human rights litigation . . . 
[because] the right to be free from torture is more absolute in nature, provides 
more protection because there is less room for balancing against public interest, 
and is more universally recognised and applicable.”97 These recommendations 
were made in the Committee’s concluding observations on China’s fifth periodic 
report, adopted in 2016.98 Specifically, the recommendations call upon China to 
“[t]ake the necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to guarantee 
respect for the autonomy and physical and personal integrity of . . . transgender 
and intersex persons,” particularly in the context of forced conversion therapy, 
and other “abusive treatment.”99 The limited scope of the committee’s 
recommendations might caution against an advocacy strategy focused exclusively 
on engaging U.N. bodies concerned with the implementation of international 
norms around the prohibition against torture. It may be prudent, however, to call 
for expanding the scope of CAT protections to include prohibitions on state 
sanctioned discriminatory actions that have the effect of producing severe 
psychological harm similar to that experienced by members of the transgender 
community as a result of both state-sanctioned and private discrimination. Such 
an amendment may be timely given the pushback challenges to transgender 
discrimination face in domestic U.S. courts. 
The transgender service ban—at least—implicates CAT prohibitions on 
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” contained in Articles 1 and 16 of the 
Convention. As noted above in the discussion of ICCPR prohibitions on torture, 
discrimination has a profound effect on the mental health and social functioning 
 
Reservations to Treaties: An Introduction, 24 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L. L. 1055 (2013) (describing the example 
of reservations and objections to the Genocide Convention, and the ICJ’s role in determining the 
validity of reservations). 
 95.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 21(1)(a); see also THE YALE L. J. COMP. INC., 
supra note 94. 
 96.  Geoffrey Yeung, Using the Convention Against Torture to Advance Transgender and Intersex 
Rights, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (May 26, 2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/using-the-convention-
against-torture-to-advance-transgender-and-intersex-rights/. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  U.N. Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, 
CAT/C/SR.1368 and 1371 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx? 
enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhslEE2YuVt8GA5WKG3GEX%2BZEXqjnsVnWP%2BkQ6f9cmzWcE
PJYdFWEXvIFmDTE3WtKbIKZXAKr5OVTwnh86Q4GNZXSmrqMf55xyaMPMcFusW3o2. 
 99.  Id. para. 56(a);(c). 
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of all persons, in particular members of the transgender community.100 Under an 
expanded understanding of treatment prohibited by CAT—particularly “abusive 
treatment”101 which has the effect of degrading the “autonomy . . . and personal 
integrity of . . . transgender . . . persons,”102 the transgender service ban is in 
violation of the United States’ CAT obligations. While the reservations to CAT 
filed by the United States at the time of ratification no doubt complicate matters, 
under an inclusive advocacy strategy,103 the CAT, and recent developments 
around the Convention’s applicability to discrimination against members of the 
transgender community, has a role to play in challenging the transgender service 
ban. 
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[ICESCR] imposes positive obligations104 on State Parties to fulfil the myriad rights 
guaranteed in the Covenant, including the right to work,105 “safe and healthy 
working conditions,”106 “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health,”107 and imposes on State Parties 
the obligation “to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to . . . sex . . . or other 
status.”108 ICESCR also contains an independent clause obligating that states 
“undertake to ensure . . . the equal right of men and women [to] the enjoyment of 
all economic, social and cultural [ESC] rights set forth in” ICESCR.109 
The Committee on ESC Rights interprets ICESCR’s non-discrimination 
provision to protect against discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and 
notes that transgender persons “often face serious human rights violations, such 
as harassment in schools or in the workplace.”110 The Committee takes a strong 
stance on the conceptual difference between sex and gender in its General 
Comment number 16, concerning the Article 3 obligation to ensure equality 
between men and women in the enjoyment of ESC rights.111 
 
 
 100.  See supra notes 73-79. 
 101.  See U.N. Committee Against Torture, supra note 98. 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  See infra notes 146-58. 
 104.  For an explanation of the difference between positive and negative obligations under 
international human rights law, see Bryan H. Druzin, supra note 45. 
 105.  ICESCR, supra note 38, art. 6. 
 106.  Id., art. 7. 
 107.  Id., art. 12.  
 108.  Id., art. 2(2). 
 109.  Id., art. 3.  
 110.  U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Non-discrimination in Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), General Comment No. 20, para. 32 (42nd Sess. 2009). 
 111.  U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 16, para. 14 (34th Sess. 2005). 
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Additionally, the Committee interprets ICESCR’s Article 4 right to work 
provision as “affirm[ing] the obligation of States parties to assure individuals their 
right to freely chosen or accepted work, including the right not to be deprived of 
work unfairly.”112 States have the obligation to ensure that the “labour market [is] 
open to everyone under the jurisdiction of the States parties.”113 The Committee 
on ESC Rights took note of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity in healthcare, in a general comment, concluding: 
Non-discrimination, in the context of the right to sexual and reproductive health, 
also encompasses the right of all persons, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex persons, to be fully respected for their sexual orientation, 
gender identity and intersex status. . . . State parties . . . have an obligation to 
combat homophobia and transphobia, which lead to discrimination, including 
violation of the right to sexual and reproductive health.114 
 State sanctioned discrimination on the basis of transgender status, in 
employment and healthcare, clearly violates State Party obligations under 
ICESCR. However, the United States has not ratified ICESCR, and has only signed 
the Convention. Thus, an additional interpretive step is required to determine the 
object and purpose of the Convention and the resulting obligations of signatory 
parties. 
Scholars have noted that determining the object and purpose of a treaty is a 
complicated task, which often results in significant disagreement among States 
parties.115 Further complicating the analysis, determining a treaty’s object and 
purpose requires an understanding of the term “object and purpose” as utilized in 
international law.116 Despite the circularity of the framework used to determine a 
treaty’s object and purpose, doing so is critical, especially because holding 
powerful State signatories (such as the United States) accountable for human  
  
 
 112.  U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, The Right to Work, General 
Comment No. 18, para. 4 (35th Sess. 2005). 
 113.  Id. para. 12(b). 
 114.  U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on 
the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), General Comment No. 22 (2016). 
 115.  See David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Sanders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive 
Methods, 43 VAND. J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 565, 567 (2010) (alterations in original) (Arguing “object and 
purpose is a term of art without a workable definition. Broadly speaking, it refers to a treaty’s essential 
goals, as if a treaty’s text could be boiled down to a concentrated broth—the essence of a treaty. Beyond 
this general idea, scholars have failed to create a definition with adequate clarity and detail to serve 
lawyers who must apply the term in practice. Those who have attempted to do so admit ‘with regret’ 
that it remains an ‘enigma’ that, ‘[i]nstead of reducing the potential of future conflicts . . . [,] plants the 
seed of them.’”). 
 116.  See id. at 577 (Arguing that Vienna Convention rules regarding the interpretation of treaties, 
specifically as elaborated upon in Article 31 of the Convention [requiring that treaties be interpreted in 
light of their texts, contexts, and objects and purposes] requires an interpretation of “object and 
purpose” under Article 31. Further arguing that, based upon the text, context, and teleology of “object 
and purpose,” “object and purpose” should be understood as a “unitary concept referring to the goals 
that the drafters of the treaty hoped to achieve.” (p. 578)). 
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rights violations often depends on the construction of an agreement’s object and 
purpose. 
Typically, ICESCR’s object and purpose is interpreted, at a minimum, to 
include fulfillment of “core obligations”117 and ensuring the “progressive 
realization” of economic, social, and cultural rights.118 The Committee on ESC 
Rights’ has indicated that States parties to the Convention are bound under the 
treaty to ensure fulfillment of ICESCR’s core obligations.119 The text of the 
Convention provides, however, that States parties must ensure the progressive 
realization of ICESCR obligations.120 Regardless of what these competing 
understandings mean for States bound to not take action violative of ICESCR’s 
object and purpose, at a minimum, States parties bound by signatory obligations 
would be obligated to avoid taking affirmative action to bar equal access to ESC 
rights for a discrete group protected under ICESCR. 
The transgender service ban is a violation of the United States’ obligations as 
an ICESCR signatory party. Under international law, signatory State parties to 
ICESCR have the obligation to not take action that would “defeat”121 ICESCR’s 
object and purpose. The transgender service ban constitutes state action that 
defeats any iteration of ICESCR’s object and purpose. The ban is intended to 
arbitrarily prevent members of a marginalized group, who are protected by 
ICESCR’s non-discrimination provision, from accessing employment and 
healthcare—two rights unequivocally guaranteed by ICESCR—because of their 
membership in that group. Military service is employment.122 Additionally, active 
duty military personnel, and U.S. veterans are typically eligible to receive fairly 
comprehensive healthcare benefits.123 The transgender service ban not only 
restricts access to “freely chosen” employment opportunities, but more 
importantly, unfairly deprives transgender persons of access to an entire career 
path.124 Additionally, the stated rationale for the ban explicitly revolves around the 
cost of providing adequate healthcare to transgender persons.125 Such a rationale 
and rule deprive transgender persons of access to adequate healthcare, in further 
violation of ICESCR obligations.126 Ultimately, whether the object or purpose of 
 
 117.  Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. OF 
TRANSNATIONAL L. 905, 940 (2009). 
 118.  Id. at 942. 
 119.  Id. at 940. 
 120.  See id. at 943 (“Where the implementation of an obligation depends on a considerable amount 
of resources, as do some of the proposed core obligations, the text of Article 2(1) does not lend itself to 
an interpretation that turns such an obligation into an immediate one.”). 
 121.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 18. 
 122.  See Pay, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: MILITARY COMPENSATION (accessed Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://militarypay.defense.gov/Pay/ (describing types of salary received by members of the armed 
forces); Careers and Jobs, U.S. ARMY (accessed Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-
jobs.html (referring to the various “career paths” enlistees in the Army can pursue as “active duty 
Soldier[s].”). 
 123.  Health Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (accessed Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.va.gov 
/HEALTHBENEFITS/apply/active_duty.asp. 
 124.  See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 112. 
 125.  See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 5. 
 126.  See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 114. 
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ICESCR is understood to require immediate fulfillment of minimum core 
obligations,127 or progressive realization,128 the transgender service ban—a state 
action that affirmatively restricts access to at least two ICESCR core rights— 
derogates from the object and purpose of ICESCR, and constitutes a violation of 
United States ICESCR obligations as a signatory party. 
4. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women [CEDAW] mandates States parties to the convention “condemn all forms 
of discrimination against women”129—defined as— 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women . . . on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field.130 
CEDAW obligates States parties “[t]o take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation,” to eliminate discrimination against women,131 and “ensure 
the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
a basis of equality with men.”132 Additionally, States parties are obliged to take 
measures “[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and 
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotypes roles for men and women.”133 
Despite CEDAW’s apparent focus on sex discrimination, CEDAW’s TMB, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, has interpreted 
CEDAW’s provisions to cover gender-based discrimination as well.134 The 
Committee, while noting that “[i]ntersectionality is a basic concept for 
understanding the scope of general obligations of States parties,” concluded that 
discrimination against women arises from a multiplicity of identity factors, 
including, inter alia, gender identity.135 As a result, States parties to CEDAW have 
the obligation to take measures to eliminate intersectional discrimination against 
women,136 
 
 127.  See Mechlem, supra note 117 at 941. 
 128.  See id. at 942. 
 129.  CEDAW, supra note 39, art. 2.  
 130.  Id., art. 1.  
 131.  Id., art. 2. 
 132.  Id., art. 3.  
 133.  Id., art. 5. 
 134.  U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Comment No. 
28  on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, General Comment No. 28 (2010). 
 135.  Id. at 5, para. 18. 
 136.  Id.  
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Similar to ICESCR, the United States has not ratified CEDAW, but signed the 
Convention on July 17, 1980.137 Again, as a signing party, the United States has an 
obligation under international law to refrain from taking action that would 
“defeat”138 the object and purpose of CEDAW. Scholars has noted that 
“CEDAW’s object and purpose is likely twofold: the ‘elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women’ and gender equality.”139 Assuming based upon 
CEDAW’s language, and interpretations of the Convention’s text by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, that CEDAW’s 
purpose expands beyond mere protection of women against discrimination on the 
basis of sex, and extends to protecting women—including women who experience 
intersectional discrimination because of their gender identities—from gender and 
sex non-conforming gender identity based discrimination, the transgender service 
ban would clearly erode the object and purpose of CEDAW, in violation of the 
United States’ commitments under the Convention as a signing party. 
Even assuming a limited construction of CEDAW’s object and purpose—one 
that does not stretch the Convention to include among its recognized forms of 
prohibited discrimination, discrimination against members of the transgender 
community,140 generally—the transgender service ban still has the effect of 
discriminating against women who identify as transgender. In theory, application 
of the transgender service ban to individuals who identify as women, but were 
assigned male sex at birth (meaning their gender is female), and individuals who 
identify as men, but were assigned the female sex at birth and have not had sex 
reassignment surgery violates CEDAW’s object and purpose. As discussed above 
in relation to the United States’ commitments under ICESCR,141 any affirmative 
state action mandating discrimination against women because of their sexual or 
gender identities as women, in light of the object and purpose of the Convention, 
would necessarily violate a signing party’s obligation to refrain from taking action 
that would violate the object and purpose of the Convention.  This is true 
regardless of whether the object and purpose is defined comprehensively or 
narrowly. The transgender service ban is clearly an affirmative government act, 
which discriminates against a group of persons, within which women are 
included—namely women who identify as transgender (regardless of their 
biological sex). Therefore, it violates the United States’ commitments as a signatory 
party to CEDAW.  
In addition, the transgender service ban is arguably rooted in stereotyped 
reasoning about the ways in which men and women should behave—or, gender 
stereotypes.142 “By excluding an entire category of people on this characteristic 
 
 137.  UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties, (accessed Dec. 21, 2017) 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
 138.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 18.  
 139.  Elise Mayer, Designing Women: The Definition of “Woman” in the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 CHI. J. UNT’L. L. 533, 579 (2016).  
 140.  For an additional and comprehensive discussion of CEDAW’s general applicability to the 
transgender community, see id. 
 141.  See supra notes 121-28. 
 142.  See Doe 1 v. Trump, Civil Action No, 17—1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at 28 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 
2017); see also Zack Ford, Federal Judge Suspends Trump’s Transgender Military Ban, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 
30, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/trans-military-injunction-be6139 c6f3e9/. 
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alone, the Accession and Retention Directives punish individuals for failing to 
adhere to gender stereotypes.”143 Therefore, if the object and purpose of CEDAW 
were formulated more broadly to include fostering “gender equality,”144 the 
transgender service ban, which is rooted in stereotyped reasoning145 and promotes 
gender inequality, would directly contravene the object of fostering equality 
between men and women. As a result, a comprehensive human rights based 
advocacy strategy should incorporate CEDAW principles and examine potential 
advocacy channels, available as a result of CEDAW. 
III. A COMPREHENSIVE ADVOCACY STRATEGY TARGETING THE                  
TRANSGENDER SERVICE BAN 
Given the limitations of an advocacy strategy focused exclusively on 
domestic litigation146 and legislative change,147 advocacy challenging the 
transgender service ban, and other forms of discrimination against the transgender 
community, should incorporate applicable international human rights law 
instruments and doctrine, as well as efforts directed at international human rights 
fora, including relevant treaty monitoring bodies. 
First, utilizing an international human rights law framework renders 
accessible additional fora through which advocacy may be directed. Most 
importantly among these fora are two of the relevant treaty monitoring bodies 
discussed above, and specifically the Human Rights Committee. While the United 
States has not consented to have individual complaints brought against it in these 
bodies,148 the U.S. is obliged to comply with monitoring requirements, which 
include taking part in periodic compliance assessments.149 In part, the purpose of 
“the reporting process [is to] create[] a basis for constructive dialogue between 
States and treaty bodies . . . in fostering effective national implementation of the 
international human rights instruments.”150 The reporting process is also designed 
to provide States with opportunities to review their compliance with human rights 
treaties, and to “facilitate, at the national level, public scrutiny of government 
policies and constructive engagement with relevant actors of civil society.”151 
 
 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  See Mayer, supra note 139. 
 145.  Doe 1 v. Trump, 2017 WL 4873042, at 28. 
 146.  See supra notes 11-34. 
 147.  See supra note 35. 
 148.  UNITED NATIONS, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessed Dec. 21, 2017), https://treaties.un.org 
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4& clang=_en; Optional Protocol to 
the convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (accessed 
Dec. 21, 2017), https://treaties.un.org /Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg _no=IV-9b&chap 
ter=4& clang=_en. 
 149.  United Nations Rep. of the Secretary-General, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content 
of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (Jun. 3, 2009). 
 150.  Id. at 5, para. 11.  
 151.  Id. para. 10.  
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During recent periodic assessments, civil society groups played an important 
role in addressing shortcomings of treaty compliance by the United States.152 
[T]hey participate in the preparation of the government’s own reports, lobby at 
review sessions, and monitor domestic Convention implementation. CSOs make 
their most significant contribution to the review process through the submission 
of “shadow reports,” which augment and contextualize the United States’ 
formal reports by detailing areas where the United States allegedly has failed to 
meet its Convention obligations, shedding light on “what is actually happening 
on a daily basis to communities of color across the U.S.” 153 
The United States is due to complete its fourth periodic review under the 
ICCPR in 2019.154 This is particularly important given the timing of U.S. political 
cycles, and the anticipated Presidential election in 2020. Completed reports by civil 
society organizations and findings by the Human Rights Committee addressing 
human rights non-compliance in the United States may encourage officials to 
adopt policies aimed at complying with human rights obligations. In particular, 
given the relatively high publicity the transgender service ban received,155 
explicitly linking the ban to non-compliance with international obligations may 
galvanize efforts challenging the Executive Order, and other forms of state 
sanctioned discrimination against the transgender community. 
Besides advocacy focused on highlighting treaty obligations and non-
compliance in treaty monitoring bodies, applying the international human rights 
law framework to the transgender service ban has the potential to provide United 
Nations’ special procedures mandate holders with a framework for addressing 
how the transgender service ban violates international obligations, and how it 
relates to more wide-spread discrimination against the transgender community.156 
Special procedures “are independent human rights experts with mandates to 
report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific 
perspective.”157 Simply calling the transgender service ban a violation of 
international law, and demonstrating how the ban implicates international 
obligations, may attract attention to the more widespread attacks on transgender 
 
 152.  See generally Bradley Silverman, The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the United States’ 
Recently-Concluded CERD Review, 40 YALE J. OF INT’L. L. 199 (2015) (describing the role played by civil 
society groups during the United States’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination [CERD] periodic review, including the submission of shadow reports on particular 
areas of concern for particular groups.) 
 153.  Id. at 200 (citations omitted).  
 154.  UNITED NATIONS, Reporting Status for the United States of America (accessed Dec. 21, 2017), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=USA&Lang=E
N. 
 155.  Chase Strangio. The Fight for Open Transgender Military Service is Only Beginning, ACLU (Dec. 
15, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/transgender-rights/fight-open-transgender-military-
service-only-beginning. 
 156.  See Scott Skinner-Thomson, How Trump May Inadvertently Advance Transgender Rights, 
SLATE.COM (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/11/30/how_trump_is_ 
inadvertently_advancing_transgender_rights.html (Discussing the widespread attacks on transgender 
rights by the Trump administration during Donald Trump’s first year in office.). 
 157.  UNITED NATIONS, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (accessed Dec. 21, 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. 
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rights within the United States,158 and lead to an examination of the status of 
transgender persons in the United States by independent experts. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by utilizing an international human 
rights framework, advocates provide victims of discrimination with additional 
opportunities for their voices to be heard and to participate in efforts challenging 
the victimization they experience.159 As a central tenant of the human rights 
framework, participation ensures that “[p]eople have a right to participate in how 
decisions are made regarding protection of their rights.”160 For groups 
experiencing discrimination at the hands of their governments, including the 
transgender community in the United States, participation guarantees that 
marginalized groups are provided with a platform for challenging discrimination 
they face, and provides members of the group with a voice to impact changes in 
policies effecting them.161 Therefore, utilizing the international human rights law 
framework to challenge transgender discrimination provides victims of human 
rights violations with an additional benefit, through enabling them to participate 
in advocacy and decision-making concerning the rights violations they experience. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The international human rights law framework provides advocates 
challenging the Trump administration’s discriminatory policies with additional 
tools, particularly the core human rights treaties, as well as additional fora, 
including most importantly the Human Rights Committee, through which 
advocacy may be directed. These additional opportunities for challenging the 
ban—or challenging broader discrimination faced by the transgender community 
using the transgender service ban as an example of the kind of discrimination 
faced by members of the transgender community—are of particular importance 
considering the unfavorable state of U.S. law as related to transgender rights, and 
U.S. legislative capacity to undo executive action. Additionally, the international 
human rights law framework encourages participation in advocacy efforts by 
victims of rights violations. Therefore, by challenging transgender discrimination 
under the international human rights law framework, victims of gender identity 
discrimination will be empowered to direct advocacy against policies threatening 
their abilities to equally participate in society. While potential gains under the 
human rights framework may be modest and indirect, using human rights law as 
a complement to domestic U.S. advocacy strategies challenging transgender  
 
 
 158.  See Skinner-Thomson, supra note 154.  
 159.  NATIONAL ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, What are the Basic Principles of the Human 
Rights Framework?, https://www.nesri.org/programs/what-are-the-basic-principles-of-the-human-
rights-framework (accessed Dec. 21, 2017). 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  United Nations Human Rights Council: Rep. of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples and the Right to Participate in 
Decision-Making, A/HRC/15/25 (Aug. 23, 2010) (discussing the role of participation in international 
human rights law instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and how the 
right to participation entails collective and personal participation, as well as general and specific forms 
of participation in decision-making). 
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discrimination will undoubtedly lead to at least modest gains—and modest gains 
are gains nonetheless. 
 
